Schematicity and applicability

Παρουσίαση με θέμα: "Schematicity and applicability"— Μεταγράφημα παρουσίασης:

1 Schematicity and applicability
David Tuggy ILV-Mexico

2 General assumptions As general background for this talk, here are some general propositions which I have come to believe strongly, about language and translation. You can view them as conclusions I will come to at the end, or as presuppositions I bring to the beginning, of the thoughts I hope to lead you through.

3 General assumptions Language is primarily concerned with communication of meaning, and meanings are extremely and often subtly complex. Perfect communication is not possible, even between speakers of the same language. You do as well as you can, which is often surprisingly well.

4 General assumptions The linguistic, and particularly the semantic systems of two languages are bound to differ in important ways. Perfect translation is (by several orders of magnitude) less possible than perfect communication. You do as well as you can, which is often surprisingly well.

5 Schematicity This talk concerns one of the ways in which languages are very complex and differ from each other. btw and fwiw—this is all orthodox Cognitive Grammar: Taylor 2002, Langacker 2008 It is thus one of the issues which make translation difficult and perfect translation impossible. It is the parameter of schematicity-specificity.

6 Schematicity Schematicity is one of the qualities that are sometimes called “abstractness”: schematic meanings are abstract meanings. Essentially, a schematic meaning designates the same thing or relationship as its more-specific counterparts (“elaborations”), but omits (“abstracts away from”) details.

7 Schematicity Generally whatever is called “abstract” omits details, but often people use the word to describe terms that designate something rather different from what the more-specific terms do. That is the major reason that I prefer to use the word “schematic” rather than “abstract”. By definition a schematic concept’s specifications are all fulfilled within its elaborations. This is not always true of concepts that are called “abstract”.

8 Schematicity The relationship is precisely that of a hyperonymic meaning (schema) to its hyponyms (elaborations). I use an arrow from the schema to the elaboration to represent the relationship.

9 Schematicity For instance:

10 Schematicity B (base)  T (target) means:
B is schematic for T, T is an elaboration of B. B is a hyperonym, T is its hyponym. B is a generalization, T is a specific case of that generalization. B is a pattern, T is a fleshed-out pattern. B is generic, T is specific.

11 Schematicity B  T means:
B is a rule, T is a sub-case; a more-specific rule or application of that rule. Everything that is true of B is true of T (but not vice-versa.) T is a B, T is a kind of B.

12 Schematicity Our thinking is shot through with relationships of schematicity. Every concept that we can communicate (and probably every concept that we can learn) is schematic in some degree. In language we deal only with patterns —i.e., more- or less-schematic concepts—, never with absolutely or fully elaborate/specific concepts.

13 Partial schematicity = similarity
“Partial schematicity” is similarity —full schematicity is nearer to a kind of one-way identity. Partial schematicity is symbolized by a dashed arrow: B - -  T means T (target of comparison) is similar to B (base of comparison). Many, but in this case *not* all, of the characteristics of B are found in T.

14 Partial schematicity = similarity
For instance:

15 Schematicity As more characteristics of B are found and fewer contradictions of B show up in T, the likeness is closer, and nearer to full schematicity.

16 Schematicity Thus likeness (partial schematicity) is a matter of more or less: full schematicity is the limiting case. [Full identity is a matter of full schematicity in both directions: A  B and A  B (≡ B  A).]

17 Schematicity Human categorization is, largely if not totally, based on relations of likeness, i.e. of full or partial schematicity. As an example of such categorization, and of what I mean by saying that human thought is shot through by these kinds of relationships, the following is a notably incomplete attempt to represent graphically the established meanings of the stem kīsa ‘emerge’ in Orizaba Nawatl (nlv).

18 Schematicity (kīsa)

19 Schematicity and meaning ranges
The influence of the schematicity parameter on meanings, and thus on translation, is profound and very complex. For starters, different portions of a sequence of schemas may be named or evoked by different words or expressions in the same or other languages.

20 Schematicity and meaning ranges
For instance:

21 Schematicity and meaning ranges
The same holds true in spades when one considers more complex categories rather than a simple hierarchies. For instance, the meanings labeled kīsa in Nawatl are labeled rather differently in English.

22 Schematicity

23 Schematicity and meaning ranges
Another complicating factor is that generally one can (and often does) “play around” with meanings, evoking well-established meanings in order to communicate less well-established but similar meanings. Often we name or describe a more-schematic concept in order to convey a more-elaborate one. We habitually underspecify.

24 Schematicity and meaning ranges
Or else we name a similar concept, not quite the one we have in mind. We then leave it to the context (both linguistic and non-linguistic) to clarify the details. However, if the communication is successful, this tends to entrench the newer meaning. The establishment of a newer meaning does not undo the established meaning, nor vice versa.

25 Schematicity and meaning ranges
The net result of this (and other factors) is the propensity of an expression’s meaning to expand so as to occupy an greater or smaller area or range of meaning rather than a single point. The meaning of kīsa is an example of what I mean. Kīsa does not mean only “[the sun] rise”, or “hatch” or “[tooth] come in” or “leave” or “turn out” or “emerge” or “almost” or “change of state”, but all of the above. It is a/the standard way to name all those situations.

26 Schematicity Triangles
An extremely important and common sub-configuration of such structures is the “schematicity triangle” It occurs whenever two similar, relatively elaborate (detailed) concepts share a schema. I.e.:

27 Schematicity Triangles
Often, of course, comparison goes both ways between the relatively elaborate concepts. I.e.:

28 Schematicity Triangles
Schematicity triangles may arise in several ways. One way is by a schema being expanded “downwards”, its elaborations becoming established through usage. (In succeeding diagrams I will use the color green to indicate structures relatively new to the hearer or to both speaker and hearer.)

29 Schematicity Triangles
For instance, the general concept of physical emerging from a container-like object was clearly well-established as a meaning of kīsa centuries ago. Within the last 100 years many, probably most speakers of Orizaba Nawatl have encountered the idea of people getting out of a car or a bus. As they encounter these concepts, it is clear that they are cases of emerging.

30 Schematicity Triangles —Downwards

31 Schematicity Triangles —Upwards
Schematicity triangles may also arise through comparison of already-established concepts. As their commonality is repeatedly noted, it becomes established in the mind, and if it includes the most central specifications, it constitutes a new schema. A new case of the triangular configuration results.

32 Schematicity Triangles —Upwards

33 Schematicity Triangles —Upwards
As another example of upward growth, the concept of the sun rising past the horizon is similar to that of the moon rising past the horizon. As a child learns these concepts he is quite certain to compare them.

34 Schematicity As the two concepts are compared with each other, their commonality is entrenched as a new schema in the child’s mind.

35 Schematicity If their commonality is already entrenched in the person’s mind, this comparison process will only tend to reinforce it. Thus comparison fuels schema formation and entrenchment.

36 Metaphors One place where this schematicity triangle is important is in metaphors. In every metaphor, the literal meaning is similar to the intended application, and the commonality between those two meanings is what drives the metaphor. The more-prominently established (“literal”) meaning is extended via a relationship of (relatively distant) partial schematicity to the new sense. Their commonality constitutes an incipient schema. For instance:

37 Metaphors

38 Metaphors The meaning of a metaphor is not only the literal sense (B), nor only the target sense (T), nor only the schema (S). It is the whole triangle. If the metaphor is novel, the triangle will occur for the first time. But it does not take many repetitions before the whole triangle begins to be established as a meaning associated with and therefore potentially evoked by the phonological form. The meanings ‘slam-dunk’ and ‘pin’ are no longer novel, but are established senses of clavada for many Spanish speakers. They continue to be metaphorical as long as the triangle endures.

39 Metaphorical proverbs
Metaphors grade into proverbs and parables. They differ in complexity of the coding expressions, and complexity of the mappings between the base (literal sense) and target (metaphorical sense). I’m particularly interested here in a kind of metaphorical proverb that is sometimes called a “gnomic saying”. A specific literal image is evoked, but clearly the hearer is expected to extract a particular kind of schema and apply it to specific cases within his purview.

40 Metaphorical proverbs
A proverb describing such proverbs is the following: If the shoe fits wear it. In other words, extract the appropriate schema, let it apply to the particular situation, but also keep it available for other situations. Let the shoe fit where it should.

41 Metaphorical proverbs

42 Metaphorical proverbs
The meaning is not just the literal sense, but the schema or principle that sense exemplifies. That schema is intended to be applied to particular cases, completing the schematicity triangle.

43 Metaphorical proverbs

44 Metaphorical proverbs
The meaning is not just the idea of looking for buzzards to find bodies, but of paying attention to relevant signs, and particularly looking for signs of Jesus’ return. This application completes the schematicity triangle. Neither is the meaning just paying attention to relevant signs, or looking for signs of Jesus’ return. It is the whole triangle. *Not* necessarily can you translate the whole tri-angle, or even for some purposes would you want to. The topmost schema remains available to be applied to other particular cases.

45 Translation issues related to the above
1. Lgs don’t have terms at same level of schematicity. a. Go for higher (less often lower) schematicity. b. Construct s.t. non-standard to achieve the same level of schematicity. c. Combination of some degree of above. 2. (lesser version of 1) What is easy / feasible in one lg is difficult / unexpected / costly/etc. in the other. It will be a judgment call how much difficulty is too much and will require adjustment.

46 Translation issues related to the above
3. Lgs don’t have the links available to guarantee the “jumps” between specifics and non-expressed schematics. Nawatl speakers (or others who don’t play chess) will not see the appropriateness of calling a pin a clavada. 4. One lg may make a habit of metaphors/ parables/ gnomic utterances where another rarely uses them. Therefore hearers are unlikely to extract the appropriate schema and thus see the relevance of what was said. Sometimes it may be necessary to represent that schematic meaning more explicitly.

47 Mat 7.7 ff For instance: Αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν, ζητεῖτε καὶ εὑρήσετε, κρούετε καὶ ἀνοιγήσεται ὑμῖν· 8 πᾶς γὰρ ὁ αἰτῶν λαμβάνει καὶ ὁ ζητῶν εὑρίσκει καὶ τῷ κρούοντι ἀνοιγήσεται. 9 ἢ τίς ἐστιν ἐξ ὑμῶν ἄνθρωπος, ὃν αἰτήσει ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἄρτον, μὴ λίθον ἐπιδώσει αὐτῷ; 10 ἢ καὶ ἰχθὺν αἰτήσει, μὴ ὄφιν ἐπιδώσει αὐτῷ; 11 * εἰ οὖν ὑμεῖς πονηροὶ ὄντες οἴδατε δόματα ἀγαθὰ διδόναι τοῖς τέκνοις ὑμῶν, πόσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς δώσει ἀγαθὰ τοῖς αἰτοῦσιν αὐτόν.e 12 Πάντα οὖν ὅσα ἐὰν θέλητε ἵνα ποιῶσιν ὑμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε αὐτοῖς· οὗτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται.

48 Schematicity Αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν
The verb αἰτέω has a range of meaning that includes a human being requesting various kinds of things from another human (or divine) being. Generally excluded from that range is the requesting of information.

49 Schematicity Αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν
The latter kind of concept is often named by a different verb: We are clearly here dealing with a schematicity issue, and can recognize multiple instances of the schematicity triangle.

50 Schematicity Αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν

51 Schematicity Αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν
This does not mean that Koiné Greek speakers were unaware of the similarities between the ideas of asking for physical objects or favors and asking for information—it just means that the text we are translating does not particularly activate that similarity.

52 Schematicity Αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν
It does not even mean that the author wished his addressees to exclude information from the range of things Jesus is represented as encouraging his hearers to ask for. I would guess that if asked he would probably say “Sure, that too.”

53 Schematicity Αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν
The English verb ask designates the whole complex, with perhaps asking for information being the most prominent case.

54 Schematicity Αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν

55 Schematicity There are other verbs which specialize in one or the other type of asking (e.g. request, query, inquire) , but they are somewhat odd, non-usual lexical choices. So is ask a good translation for αἰτέω ? Yes. Not necessarily. Probably so, here. But not straightforward. (Note how contextual information helps make it clear which kind of asking is particularly in mind.)

56 Schematicity Αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν
Spanish, like Koiné, makes a lexical distinction here: pedir = request an object; preguntar = request information. (Nevertheless, there is nothing wrong with the collocation pedir información, where the object of pedir is specified to be information.) Bottom line, for Spanish pedir works well as a translation of αἰτέω here. Preguntar does not.

57 Mat 7.7 ff Αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν, ζητεῖτε καὶ εὑρήσετε, κρούετε καὶ ἀνοιγήσεται ὑμῖν· 8 πᾶς γὰρ ὁ αἰτῶν λαμβάνει καὶ ὁ ζητῶν εὑρίσκει καὶ τῷ κρούοντι ἀνοιγήσεται. 9 ἢ τίς ἐστιν ἐξ ὑμῶν ἄνθρωπος, ὃν αἰτήσει ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἄρτον, μὴ λίθον ἐπιδώσει αὐτῷ; 10 ἢ καὶ ἰχθὺν αἰτήσει, μὴ ὄφιν ἐπιδώσει αὐτῷ; 11 * εἰ οὖν ὑμεῖς πονηροὶ ὄντες οἴδατε δόματα ἀγαθὰ διδόναι τοῖς τέκνοις ὑμῶν, πόσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς δώσει ἀγαθὰ τοῖς αἰτοῦσιν αὐτόν.e 12 Πάντα οὖν ὅσα ἐὰν θέλητε ἵνα ποιῶσιν ὑμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε αὐτοῖς· οὗτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται.

58 Powerpoint to be available at www.sil.org/~tuggyd