Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου

Παρουσίαση με θέμα: "Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου"— Μεταγράφημα παρουσίασης:

1 Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου
21/12/2018 BREXIT

2 4. Θεσμικά έγγραφα των διαπραγματεύσεων
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου 21/12/2018 Βιβλιογραφία 1. Schimelfenning F. (2018), Brexit: Differentiated Integration in the EU, Journal of European Public Policy, 25:8, pp  3. 2. Gamble A. (2018), Taking back control: the political implications of Brexit, Journal of European Public Policy, 25:8, pp 3. Φ. Χατζησταύρου & Γ. Δικαίος (2015), ‘Ο Βρετανικός νεο-ευρωσκεπτικισμός στην ευρωπαική διακυβέρνηση: Η ρητορική του Brexit και η στρατηγική του Brexin’, Κείμενο Εργασίας 62/2015, ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ, Μάιος 2015. _%CE%A7%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B6%CE%B7%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%8D%CF%81%CE%BF%CF %85_%CE%94%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%AF%CE%BF%CF%821.pdf 4. Θεσμικά έγγραφα των διαπραγματεύσεων kingdom_en?field_core_tags_tid_i18n=351 (μη δεσμευτική συμφωνία) - including Protocol on Irish border issues (δεσμευτική συμφωνία)

3 PM May’ speech laying out the general plans for UK’s, 17 January 2017
21/12/2018 A smooth and orderly Brexit is possible and it goes with a “new strategic partnership between the EU and UK. The future birth of “Global Britain”, more internationalist and open to trade with the wider world. The UK’s place in the EU would have come at the expense of UK’s global ties. Εnd the Dutch disease (financial sector and real estate). It’s important to restore UK’s parliamentary democracy and national self-determination. The importance of the trade and political relations between the Union and UK, in particular in defense and security and wished Whilst giving up to the Single Market, it’s possible to reach an ambitious Free Trade Agreement with the “freest possible trade in goods and services”. No existing model enjoyed by other countries or partial membership was suitable for Britain. PM May’ speech laying out the general plans for UK’s, 17 January 2017

4 Brexit: a picture of the crisis in Western democracies?
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου 21/12/2018 Brexit: a picture of the crisis in Western democracies? Brexit issue: a polarized narrative and personalized politics BUT also the need to find alternative frames of belonging. British exceptionalism vis-à-vis the EU BUT also the rise of multiple insecurities in the 21st century where disaffection cuts across gender, class, ideology and geographical marks. Brexit is the need of becoming an independent international player BUT is also the product of inner party divisions, unclear party strategies and positions on the EU issue.

5 Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου
21/12/2018 Populism propaganda and irrational politics or British autonomy, territoriality and sovereignty? A constructivist perspective: Identity and interest are formed in the international setting as well as they can originate from domestic society organization. The corporate identity of the state: survival interests, physical and ontological security, recognition of territoriality by other actors. Redefine the balance between physical markers of statehood (territoriality) and identity markers of political community. The post-Brexit sovereignty: British multinationalism, ‘economic cosmopolitanism’, European plurilateralism.

6 Taken as a share of the economy,
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου 21/12/2018 The EU is by a wide margin the UK’s biggest trading partner. Some 44% of UK exports go to the EU and 53% of EU imports go to the UK. The UK is more reliant on exports to the EU than the rest of the EU is reliant on exports to the UK. Taken as a share of the economy, only 3.1 per cent of GDP among the other 27 Member States is linked to exports to the UK, while 12.6 per cent of UK GDP is linked to exports to the EU. UN report UK poverty 18.pdf

7 Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου
21/12/2018

8 Immigration was at 625,000 in the year ending June 2018.
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου 21/12/2018 1991 to 2017: increase 91%, rising from 329,000 in 1991 to 644,000 in 2017. Immigration was at 625,000 in the year ending June 2018. In the year ending June 2018, emigration was 351,000. Net migration was estimated to be 285,000 in 2017 and 273,000 in the year ending June 2018. Immigration has grown faster than emigration, leading to an increase in net migration from an annual average of 37,000 in the period 1991 to 1995 to an annual average of 277,000 in the period 2013 to 2017. House of Commons, Migration Statistics, briefing paper, Number SN06077, 11 December 2018 file:///C:/Users/len/Downloads/SN06077.pdf The increase in the volume of migration flows in recent years has come almost exclusively from the European Union countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Spain and Italy in particular).

9 Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου
21/12/2018 Period 1 – end 29/03/2019 The UK triggered article 50 TEU notifying its intention to withdraw. End of the first phase of negotiations: The withdrawal agreement sets out the arrangements for UK’s withdrawal (Common provisions, Citizens’ rights, separation provisions, transition period, financial settlement, institutional and final provisions, Protocol on Irish border issues, Protocol on UK bases in Cyprus, Protocol on Gibraltar). A political declaration taking account of the framework governing its future relationship with the Union A final future cooperation deal can be concluded only when UK becomes a third country.

10 Period 2 - Important deadlines
21/12/2018 Period 2 - Important deadlines The Treaties shall cease to apply to the UK from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. Το ΗΒ θα είναι Τρίτη χώρα από 30/3/2019 Κατά την μεταβατική περίοδο (από 1/04/2019 μέχρι 31/12/2020) ισχύουν: Budget participation until the end of transition period Substantive EU law in place in the UK until the end of transition period No institutional participation from March 2019 No ECJ in the UK. The Court will have jurisdiction for cases sent from UK courts before the end of the transition period. Any extension of the transition period until the next legislative election of December 2022 would entail extra payments into the EU budget.

11 End of Period 2: The new association agreement
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου 21/12/2018 End of Period 2: The new association agreement Article 217 TFEU provides for association agreements with the EU. They must be approved by unanimous vote of the Member States and the consent of the European Parliament, and usually (but not always) have to be approved by national parliaments too.

12 The challenges for the European Commission
21/12/2018 The challenges for the European Commission ensure that constitutional elements of the Union, in particular the integrity of the single market, the existence of a state of law, guaranteed by the European Court of Justice are essential and indivisible pillars of the Union reaffirm that this constitutional unity cannot be undone during the negotiations on the UK’s exit from the Union. To negotiate a good agreement for both parties (EU & UK), without disqualifying EU membership as the most advantageous status and at the same time taking into account the balance of rights and obligations agreed with other third states.

13 The big challenge for the UK: secure preferential access to the EU market
21/12/2018 UK would like to: Continue to take advantage from sectors that enjoy a trading surplus: financial services and car manufacturing. Secure UK financial firms “Passport”: banks, insurers and asset managers generally have the right to sell financial services and establish branches anywhere in the EU without other countries being able to impose different or additional requirements. Conclude a successor (preferential?) arrangement concerning agricultural policy after withdrawing from EU’s PAC and associated subsidy schemes. UK farmers would also no longer be able to benefit from preferential access to non-EU countries secured by the EU under trade agreements. The EU imposes an average tariff of 14 per cent agricultural imports from non-EU countries (including countries that have their own special trading deals with the EU, like Norway and Switzerland), with higher rates on individual items, such as dairy products (average of 36 per cent). Secure continued access to the EU’s singe energy market and aviation markets. Control the labour movement (accept some unqualified workers and privilege high-skilled people).

14 Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου
21/12/2018 Τι είδους νέα εμπορική συμφωνία: a broader and deeper free trade area (Canada) rather than the single market (Norway) H κυρίαρχη άποψη στο ΗΒ: τοΗνωμένο Βασίλειο θα πρέπει να είναι ελεύθερο να καθορίζει δασμούς και κανονισμούς, ώστε να έχει διαπραγματευτική δύναμη. Άρα δεν μπορεί να παραμείνει μέλος της τελωνειακής ένωσης ή της ενιαίας αγοράς. A Compatibility Model’ which involves acknowledging on both sides that access to the EU’s single market is neither about ‘managing convergence’ (as in the enlargement model), nor about ‘managing divergence’, but about ‘managing differences’ (Nikolaidis, 2018).

15 Η τελική συμφωνία θα είναι λιγότερο δεσμευτική από μια συμφωνία τύπου ΕΟΧ
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου 21/12/2018 Η ΕΟΧ είναι μια διμερής συμφωνία μεταξύ ΕΕ και ΕΖΕΣ (EFTA/ Ισλανδία, Λιχτενστάιν, Νορβηγία) μέλη ΕΟΧ : overs the four freedoms, i.e. the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons, plus competition and state aid rules and horizontal areas related to the four freedoms (consumer protection, company law …) Μια συμφωνία τύπου ΕΟΧ θα σεβόταν το δημοψήφισμα στον τύπο αλλά όχι στην ουσία. Κάποιοι βρετανοί υποστήριζαν ότι η έξοδος από την ΕΕ δεν σημαίνει αυτόματα και έξοδο από την ΕΟΧ (αρ. 127, 128 ΣΛΕΕ). Θα μπορούσε το ΗΒ να είχε επιχειρήσει η μεταβατική περίοδος να έχει τα χαρακτηριστικά ΕΟΧ; Η συμφωνία ΕΟΧ απαιτεί ομοφωνία (αρ.128) στο Συμβούλιο, πολύ πιθανόν η ΕΕ να μην το δεχόταν.

16 Για αντίστοιχους λόγους εκτός και η ελβετικού τύπου συμφωνία
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου 21/12/2018 Για αντίστοιχους λόγους εκτός και η ελβετικού τύπου συμφωνία Διμερή συμφωνία ελβετικού στυλ: πρόσβαση στο Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο σε συγκεκριμένους τομείς της ενιαίας αγοράς, το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο ακολουθεί την νομοθεσία της ΕΕ στους εν λόγω τομείς, μικρή συνεισφορά στον προυπολογισμό, διαπραγμάτευση για ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία.

17 Devise a system of adjudication à la EFTA, a special Court
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου 21/12/2018 The scenario of a new Compatibility model (between EEA and FTA): less obligations, less rights but mutual regulatory recognition A minimum convergence, especially on services, between EU and UK rulings will be necessary in order to avoid reversibility of market access rights. Devise a system of adjudication à la EFTA, a special Court In case of regulatory incompatibility, ECJ review should be possible: when measures not equivalent, ECJ could decide without compelling the UK to change, UK’s formal autonomy preserved). A model allowing a country to take part in the EU’s managed mutual recognition system and nevertheless opt out of free movement of people? It’s a matter of political decision, if the EU does not insist on a strict interpretation of free movement of persons. Cherry picking sector by sector (environment, tax, social…)

18 Civilian and military cooperation EU/UK
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου 21/12/2018 Civilian and military cooperation EU/UK In the area of foreign and defence policy, the UK can refuse to apply new EU measures if it has fundamental objections to them, and the withdrawal agreement foresees an early treaty between the EU and UK that will replace the transition period rules. The future relationship should therefore enable the United Kingdom to participate on a case by case basis in CSDP missions and operations through a Framework Participation Agreement.  The EDA already has such Administrative Arrangements with several non EU-countries. The EDF for the next budget cycle provides for involvement of non-EU countries, for non EEA States some restrictions in order to participate. As for PESCO, limited participation by non-EU countries.

19 Σκληρό BREXIT (εκτός ενιαίας αγοράς)
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου Σκληρό BREXIT (εκτός ενιαίας αγοράς) 21/12/2018 Επιπτώσεις για τη ΜΒ Επιπτώσεις για την ΕΕ Χάνει το τρίπτυχο ελκυστικότητας (πρόσβαση στην ΕΑ με πανευρωπαϊκό χρηματοπιστωτικό κέντρο παγκόσμιας εμβέλειας (european passeport) και ιδιαίτερα επωφελές φορολογικό καθεστώς για τις επιχειρήσεις) φυγή επενδυτών/κεφαλαίων Επιβράδυνση ανάπτυξης διακοπή των δεσμών με τη ζώνη συναλλαγών της ΕΕ (1/6 της Ευρ. Οικονομίας, 1/10 των εξαγωγών ΕΕ προς το ΗΒ, το ½ (55% , 1999, 44%, 2015 των εξαγωγών ΗΒ πάνε σε ΕΕ) Πως θα στήσει νέα βιομηχανική πολιτική και πολιτική υποδομών αν η ΕΕ επιβάλλει απαγορευτική δασμολογική πολιτική; Οι κανόνες ΠΟΕ υπάρχουν. Προς μια Αγγλόσφαιρα επιρροής- εμπορικό μπλοκ (το επιχείρημα των προτιμησιακών συμφωνιών ΕΕ TAFTA, CETAέχει αποδυναμωθεί) Mια πιθανή μη συμφωνία θα είχε δυνητικά οφέλη, ότι για παράδειγμα το ΗΒ θα ήταν περισσότερο ελεύθερο να μειώσει τους δασμούς έναντι μη ευρωπαϊκών κρατών μελών. Αμυνα, η ΕΕ θα χάσει τη βρετανική συνεισφορά στην Άμυνα της ΕΕ Η αποχώρηση του ΗΒ θα φέρει την ΕΕ στη δεύτερη θέση από την πρώτη που είναι σήμερα μετα τις ΗΠΑ

20 Hard Brexiters’agenda rejecting the withdrawal agreement
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου 21/12/2018 Hard Brexiters’agenda rejecting the withdrawal agreement By the begining of the interim period the UK should be free (regulatory flexibility) to negotiate future tariff schedules with third countries (reinforce UK’s trade and regulatory influence in the global regulation war). Moving to substantive negotiations as soon as possible—leverage is much higher before exit. Taking the lead in World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership and explaining why the UK and WTO members now share a trade liberalising agenda. Enhancing domestic regulatory bodies to be capable of MRAs with the EU and others. Instructing UK customs agencies to talk to EU member state counterparts and enhance domestic business awareness. Evaluating and expediting US-UK, NAFTA and TPP agreements and accessions.

21 Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου
21/12/2018 The WTO scenario Καμμιά συμφωνία, εφαρμογή κανόνων ΠΟΕ (Μost Favoured Nation approach από την πλευρά του ΗΒ) : καμμία συμφωνία με κοινούς κανόνες και ρυθμίσεις, αλλά με κίνδυνο να υποστεί το κοινό εξωτερικό δασμολόγιο της ΕΕ που μπορεί να βλάψει το εμπόριο του Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου με την ΕΕ The UE without a new agreement and rely on WTO rules until a new agreement is concluded. WTO MFN rules requires the granting of equal market access to all 161 WTO countries. In this case, the EU would apply the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) rates to UK goods that it applies to all WTO members without a preferential scheme or agreement in place. Many of the MFN rates are significant compared to the currently ‘’zero tariff all exports to the EU’’ UK enjoy as part of the Single Market. The UK should re-negotiate and agree updated UK schedules of commitments with all 161 WTO members, i.e. update the terms of its WTO membership where the commitments taken have previously applied to the EU as a whole. All other WTO Members should agree how the UK will take on the rights and obligations which we have formerly taken as a part of the EU. After leaving the EU, UK would like to adopt (without new negotiation) the Free-trade agreements of the EU with approximately 40 countries; priority will be given to the agreements UE-Korea and UE- Switzerland, since they cover the 80% of the value of commercial transactions.

22 Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου
21/12/2018 NO DEAL Damaging in a long term UK exports to their largest EU market and imports, and so Brits’ purchasing power (approx. in average 15 % WTO tariffs). Leaving the position of UK citizens in the EU27 and EU citizens in the UK less secure Disrupting the UK security relationship with the EU, significantly limiting flights and commercial lorry transport with the EU Raising barriers to transfers of data from the EU to the UK Devaluating sterling and depressing wages Τurn Britain into a low-cost, business-friendly, light-regulation, privatised economy.

23 Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου
21/12/2018 Free movement issue Free movement ends at the end of the transition period. citizens’ rights: social security coordination for EU and UK citizens who moved before Brexit day and before the end of the transition period is regulated by the withdrawal agreement. For EU citizens/workers in the UK, once they have accumulated five years of legal residence in the UK, you will be able to apply for residence status in the UK to be upgraded to a permanent one. 6 months in order to find a job. visa-free travel for short-term visits.

24 Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου
21/12/2018 Irish border issues and the Backstop: impact on cross-border co-operation and trade. Irish borders: whether to remain in a transition period applying substantive EU law to the UK or enter the backstop and potentially a proportion of EU law to the UK . Because otherwise outside the EU’s Customs Union, it is necessary to impose customs checks on the movement of goods across the border. The backstop does not concern the free movement of people or services, or contribution to the EU budget but only the continuation of the UK/Ireland common travel area, which is more limited. It concerns only some aspects of single market and customs’ Union EU laws (mainly on external trade, customs, and goods regulation, plus some limited application of EU laws on labour, the environment, state aids and competition in its Annexes). In particular, backstop would still commit the UK to a chunk of EU law on trade in goods, and in a limited way to some law in the ‘level playing field’ areas, some degree of continued harmonisation of law relating to tax, the environment, labour law, state aid, competition, and public companies/monopolies. UNDER DISCUSSION: Addendum to the Political declaration: trigger the backstop only temporarily if necessary, conclude a full final deal before the end of the transition period.

25 Some challenging issues
Φιλίπ orα Χατζησταύρου 21/12/2018 Some challenging issues Backstop: Ireland in favor of the backstop because it fears that in the case of hard negotiations – no deal scenario would result in the reintroduction of borders and tariffs to trade as well as restrictions on Irish citizens. Participation in a range of EU Justice and Home Affairs (Europol and Eurojust cooperation, Frontex only if relevant EU law is applied)? What about the status of the UK’s environmental commitments made as party to various UN environmental conventions and currently implemented through EU legislation? Signatory to the ECHR or not?