ΝΑΥΤΙΛΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ Ναυτική Πειρατεία ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ αΙΓΑIΟΥ & ΑΕΙ ΠΕΙΡΑΙΑ Τ.Τ. Τμήματα Ναυτιλίας και Επιχειρηματικών Υπηρεσιών & Μηχ. Αυτοματισμού ΤΕ ΝΑΥΤΙΛΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ Ναυτική Πειρατεία 12η Διάλεξη N. ΝΙΚΗΤΑΚΟΣ καθηγητής Παν. Αιγαίου Γ.ΛΕΒΕΝΤΑΚΗΣ μεταδιδακτορικός υπότροφος Δ.Παπαχρήστος μέλος ΕΔΙΠ ΑΕΙ ΠΕΙΡΑΙΑ ΤΤ

Παρουσίαση και Εισαγωγή στην ναυτική πειρατεία Σκοπός Διάλεξης Παρουσίαση και Εισαγωγή στην ναυτική πειρατεία

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Εισαγωγή Ανάλυση της σύγχρονης τρομοκρατίας Συνέπειες της θαλάσσιας τρομοκρατίας Αντίμετρα Συμπεράσματα

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Στον απόηχο των τραγικών γεγονότων της 11ης Σεπτεμβρίου 2001 στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, ο γενικός γραμματέας του ΙΜΟ William A. O'Neil, συμβουλεύτηκε τις κυβερνήσεις των κρατών μελών σχετικά με την ανάγκη να αναθεωρηθούν τα μέτρα που είχαν ήδη εγκριθεί από τον ΙΜΟ για την καταπολέμηση των πράξεων βίας και της εγκληματικότητας στη θάλασσα

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια η επιχείρηση των τρομοκρατικών ενεργειών και δραστηριοτήτων εντός του θαλάσσιου περιβάλλοντος αφορά: - Χρήση εναντίον πλοίων ή σταθερών εξέδρων στη θάλασσα ή σε λιμένα ή κατά οποιουδήποτε από τους επιβάτες ή το προσωπικό - εναντίον παράκτιων εγκαταστάσεων ή συμπεριλαμβανομένων τουριστικών θερέτρων, περιοχές λιμένων και πόλεις-λιμάνια ή πόλεις RAND Terrorism Database Seaborne strikes = 2% of all international incidents over last 30 years 652 suicide bombings = median 5 deaths & 12 injuries Maritime incidents = median 1 death & 5 injuries

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Dictionary Definition: Robbery or illegal violence at sea UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982: Any criminal act of violence, detention, rape, or depredation For private ends By crew/passengers of a private ship On the high seas (outside a State’s jurisdiction Against another ship or persons/property on board a ship. International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Act of boarding any vessel with intent to commit theft or any other crime; and With intent/capability to use force in furtherance of that act

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Η πειρατεία στηρίζεται σε οικονομικό κέρδος ενώ Η τρομοκρατία παρακινείται από πολιτικούς στόχους πέρα από την άμεση πράξη της επίθεσης σε θαλάσσια στόχο

Anatomy of Modern Piracy Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Anatomy of Modern Piracy Drivers Poor economic conditions Weak/inadequate government Narrow channels/choke points Operating bases Motivations Economic gain – opportunity v. organized crime Political gain – maritime terrorism Groups Criminals Organized crime syndicates Free Aceh Movement (GAM) Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Mindoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια

Factors Accounting for the Emergence of Piracy Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Factors Accounting for the Emergence of Piracy Massive increase in commercial maritime traffic Higher incidence of seaborne commercial traffic that passes through narrow and congested maritime chokepoints General difficulties associated with maritime surveillance

Factors Accounting for the Emergence of Piracy Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Factors Accounting for the Emergence of Piracy Lax coastal and port-side security Corruption and emergent voids of judicial prerogative Global proliferation of small arms

Συνέπειες Ναυτικής Τρομοκρατίας Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Συνέπειες Ναυτικής Τρομοκρατίας GENERAL CRUISE SHIPS CONTAINER SHIPPING Tanker and LPG

ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΔΡΑΣΗ ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΥ ΧΤΥΠΗΜΑΤΟΣ Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΔΡΑΣΗ ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΥ ΧΤΥΠΗΜΑΤΟΣ 2005 Study* on twin ports of Los Angeles – Long Beach “The local impacts (i.e. the closure of the port on labor and other port services) of a radiological bomb attack at the two ports are … about $1.108 billion” and “up to $34 billion worth of direct, indirect and induced costs” * Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events University of Southern California, LA

Economic consequences Intangible consequences Affectedparty Human consequences Economic consequences Intangible consequences Individuals Fatalities Injuries Loss of salary Loss of property Loss of investments Loss of public services Psychological consequences leading to changes in saving, earning and consumption preferences Private sector Destruction of property Ships Facilities Transportation infrastructure Products and raw materials Loss of data Life and injury compensation Short-term disruption of business cycle Immediate lag in delivery Loss of customers Loss of revenue business interruption Increased transport costs Internal diseconomies of scale Long term transportation inefficiency Augmented security measures Increased insurance rates Loss of human capital in the private sector Changes in consumption and investment preferences Reduced tolerance of risky investments Loss of future revenue streams Decreased foreign confidence Decrease foreign investment Increased cost of foreign trade because of insecurity Shifts in stock market Decrease in tourism and resulting losses in revenue

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Affected party Human consequences Economic consequences Intangible consequences Public sector Loss of revenue for government Destruction of public infrastructure Financial costs of response and recovery Increased government spending on counterterrorism Political consequences Loss of human capital in the public sector

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια MARITIME TERRORISM AGAINSTS CRUISE SHIPS ΣΕΝΑΡΙΑ Πειρατεία ενός πλοίου κρουαζιέρας και των επιβατών (i.e. Achille Lauro) Βύθιση πλοίου (χρήση boat-born IED) Ναυάγιο ενός πλοίου με υποβρύχια παρασιτική συσκευή (χρήση από τους δύτες) Βομβιστική επίθεση στο πλοίο (δηλαδή βομβιστής αυτοκτονίας) Αντιπαράθεση επίθεση στο πλοίο χρησιμοποιώντας βαρύ πυροβολικό (Seabourne Spirit – 2005) Βιολογική επίθεση στο φαγητό ή στο νερό τροφοδοσίας του πλοίου (Mariner of the Seas - 2005)

Ευπάθεια των κρουαζιερόπλοιων Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Ευπάθεια των κρουαζιερόπλοιων   Οι έλεγχοι ασφαλείας παραμένουν πολύ λιγότερο αυστηρές από εκείνες στις εμπορικές αερομεταφορές (Μόνο το 2% των ατόμων που αρχίζουν τα σωματικά επιθεώρηση) Τσάντες δεν σαρώνονται πριν μεταφερθούν σε καμπίνες Η πλειοψηφία των εργαζόμενων του πληρώματος δεν έχει υποστεί κανένα έλεγχο σχετικά με το υπόβαθρο τους Σκάφη αγκυροβολημένα μακριά από την ακτή για μεγάλες χρονικές περιόδους (~ 24 ώρες) Παραδοσιακή πρακτική των επιβατών να συναντηθούν στα καταστρώματα με  τους συγγενείς, τους φίλους και τους θεατές Όλα τα στοιχεία για κάθε γραμμή είναι διαθέσιμα μέσω του Διαδικτύου, διαφημιστικών φυλλαδίων ή Ταξιδιωτικών Πρακτόρων

ΝΑΥΤΙΚΑ ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΑ ΚΤΥΠΗΜΑΤΑ ΣΕ CONTAINER SHIPPING Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια ΝΑΥΤΙΚΑ ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΑ ΚΤΥΠΗΜΑΤΑ ΣΕ CONTAINER SHIPPING Contemporary international maritime transport system: 112.000 merchant vessels 6.500 ports & harbor facilities 45.000 shipping bureaus 225 coastal nations Caters ~80% of commercial freight  15 millions containers  232 million point-to-point movements worldwide SCENARIOS Sinking a ship in a port or narrow channel Hijacking a ship Detonating a nuclear bomb (in a container) Detonating a dirty bomb (in a container) Detonating a conventional bomb (in a container)

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Attractiveness of container shipping as a target of terrorism Container shipping system = easy target Only 2-5% of containers are checked at ports, worldwide Container shipping system = pervasive and ubiquitous Successful attack inflicts significant economic damage on the nation Vulnerabilities of the container shipping system to terrorism Every shipment involves many actors Exporter Importer Freight forwarder Customs broker Excise inspectors Truckers Railroad workers Dock workers Crews of feeder and ocean vessels

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Ocean transport is not a concern of most citizens  attack?  little attention EXCEPTION: Sinking or disabling a vessel in a canal or strait disrupting maritime trade i.e. Malacca Strait, Panama or Suez canals Bypass?  delay + high cost  effects marginal  oil ? high perishable food ? critical medical supplies ? CONTAINERS’ SECURITY Seals and locks = easily defeated GPS transponders / radio frequency identification devices (RFID) = expensive Standards for inspecting containers at originating ports do not exist Inspection en route is almost impossible ISPS code alleviates some of these problems

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Maritime terrorism scenario Potential Human Consequences Potential Economic Consequences Potential Intangible Consequences Sink or disable a ship in a channel or at port Up to tens of fatalities and injuries of crew Tens of millions of dollars in life and injury compensation Tens of millions of dollars to repair or replace ship Hundreds of millions of dollars in lost cargo Billions of dollars in short-term business disruptions Billions of dollars in augmented security procedures Changes in firm investment increased insurance rates Loss of human capital Changes in consumer patterns of consumption Hijack ship and use to destroy infrastructure Hundreds to hundreds of fatalities and injuries of crew Several hundred civilian casualties Same as for sinking or disabling a vessel Hundreds of millions of dollars in life and injury compensation Tens of millions of dollars in damaged infrastructure Use shipping container as a delivery device for a conventional bomb Hundreds of fatalities and injuries Millions of dollars in damaged infrastructure Millions of dollars in destroyed property Cost of response and recovery Changes in firm investment Increased insurance rates

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Maritime terrorism scenario Potential Human Consequences Potential Economic Consequences Potential Intangible Consequences Use shipping container as a delivery device for a radiological dispersion device Tens to hundreds of injuries and deaths Hundreds of millions of dollars in life and injury compensation Hundreds of thousands of dollars in contaminated or damaged infrastructure Millions of dollars in contaminated or damaged property Tens of billions of dollars in short-term business disruptions Billions of dollars in augmented security procedures Cost of response and recovery Increased insurance rates Loss of human capital Changes in consumer patterns of consumption Political consequences Use shipping container as a delivery device for a nuclear weapon 50.000 to 1.000.000 deaths Hundreds of billions of dollars in life and injury compensation Billions of dollars in contaminated or damaged infrastructure Hundreds of billions of dollars in contaminated or damaged property Tens of billions of dollars in augmented security procedures Hundreds of billions of dollars in long-term macroeconomic effects

ΝΑΥΤΙΚΗ ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΣΕ TANKER SHIPPING Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια ΝΑΥΤΙΚΗ ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΣΕ TANKER SHIPPING Energy Commodity Shipments Face Varied Threats, and a Successful Attack Could Have Substantial Consequences Characteristics of Maritime Supply Chain Make It Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack Officials Are Concerned about Three Primary Types of Threats Suicide Attacks Standoff Attacks Armed Assaults Possible Consequences of an Attack Include Public Safety, Environmental, and Economic Impacts Public Safety and Environmental Consequences Vary by Commodity (LNG and LPG spills pose primarily a public safety hazard to structures and people because of the potential for fires and explosions) Blockage of Key Transit Routes, Key Facilities, or Ports Could Cost Billions Economic Consequences from the Psychological Market Reaction to an Attack Could Be Severe

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια CONCERNS CONTRIBUTIONS Small vessels operate in close proximity to critical infrastructure and key resources, as well as major transportation channels and military ships, which may be potential high-profile targets Lack of a centralized access to hull identification and vessel registration (owner) data Limited ability to identify small vessel operators because of uneven requirements for small vessel user certification and documentation Very limited Advance Notice of Arrival (ANOA) requirements for most recreational small vessels arriving from abroad Limited awareness among small vessel operators of arrival reporting requirements and limited resources to enforce requirements, making enforceability of the small vessel arrival reporting process difficult Limited ability to screen for weapons of mass destruction especially chemical and biological agents Among the large population of small vessel operators, there is a longstanding public expectation of totally unregulated access and use of waterways Large number of “eyes on the water” that would be impossible to replace using only governmental assets Serve as a deterrent by identifying suspicious activities, given their adequate education and training Willing volunteer partners to assist in providing the initial response capability for maritime incidents

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Specific risk scenarios Use of small vessels as a waterborne improvised explosive device to attack maritime targets Conveyance for smuggling weapons or part of weapons (including WMDs or IND*) into a country Conveyance for smuggling terrorists into a country Since 1980: 320.000 illegal migrants from 47 countries 2004: ~5.000 successful arrivals of illegal maritime migrants  Waterborne platform for conducting a standoff attack (i.e. MANPADS** attack) Sept 2007 10 people dressed in black San Diego 20-foot skipjack Abandon the ship

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια The greater risks involving container shipping stem from scenarios involving radiological or nuclear detonation or the extended disruptions of operations at a port The greatest risks involving cruise ships and passenger ferries stem from cruise ship scenarios involving on-board bombs or food or water supply contamination and passenger ferry scenarios involving on-board bombs and USS Cole-style improvised explosive device attacks There is little evidence that terrorists and piracy syndicates are collaborating Some plausible forms of maritime terrorism present relatively low risk in large because the targeting of such attacks is inconsistent with the primary motivation of most terrorist groups (= maximum public attention)

Παράγοντες - πτωτική τάση Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Παράγοντες - πτωτική τάση 2004 Asian Tsunami Political settlement with Free Aceh Movement US Government pressure on littoral states International policing Better ship security? Anti terror operations?

Εξοπλισμός για ναυτική ασφάλεια Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Εξοπλισμός για ναυτική ασφάλεια the Container Security Initiative the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια SOLAS Chapter XI-2 & ISPS Code Entered into force on 1 July 2004 On 1 July 2004 applied to 147 States Since 3 February 2007 applies to 158 States

International Ship and Port Facility Security Code Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

Ένα διεθνές πλαίσιο μέσω του οποίου τα πλοία και λιμενικές εγκαταστάσεις μπορούν να συνεργαστούν για τον εντοπισμό και την αποτροπή ενεργειών που απειλούν την ασφάλεια στον τομέα των θαλάσσιων μεταφορών

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Counter Measures Detection Deterrence Protection

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια DETECTION Open sources Force protection Radar Thermal imaging Visual watch

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Deterrence Warning by radio (LONG RANGE) Warning by sound and/or lights (LONG/MEDIUM RANGE) Robust posture by showing protection and/or counter measures (MEDIUM RANGE) Robust visual perimeter security (CLOSE RANGE

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Protection Anti-ballistic Anti-RPG netting Citadel On board response

Response (1) Effect of bow wave on skiff Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Response (1) Effect of bow wave on skiff

Response(2): Water hoses Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Response(2): Water hoses

Response (3) – Razor wire Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Response (3) – Razor wire

Response (4) – International navies Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια Response (4) – International navies

Ναυτιλία και Ασφάλεια

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